



Journal of Promotional Communications

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: <http://>

Russian Politics or Russian Energy Industry Lobbying: European Union Perspectives

A tale of gas and politics

Eduard Tsvetanov

Published online:

To cite this article: Tsvetanov, E. 2015. Russian Politics or Russian Energy Industry Lobbying: European Union Perspectives. A tale of gas and politics. *Journal of Promotional Communications*, 3 (3), 340-362.

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

JPC makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, JPC make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by JPC. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. JPC shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at:

<http://promotionalcommunications.org/index.php/pc/about/submissions>

Eduard Tsvetanov

Russian Politics or Russian Energy Industry Lobbying: European Union Perspectives

A tale of gas and politics

In the current study, a prediction that Russian energy industry lobbying and Russian international politics are related was tested. This prediction was derived from impressions that recently professional communications specialists and policymaking experts tend to use the Russian state and representatives from its energy industry as interchangeable. This drew the researcher's attention to the idea that lobbying in this specific context might be undergoing significant changes that, if documented, can contribute to theoretical notions of it, enriching the field with new perspectives from other scholarly disciplines. Compared to other similar studies related to this area, findings from this research indicated that there is a tendency for lobbying to evolve under the influence of a different political economic narrative. This suggests that lobbying can take significantly different forms in different socio-political environments, thus requiring more theoretical flexibility in investigating lobbying in relation to democracy, political economy and areas such as international politics.

Keywords: Lobbying; International politics; Political economy; Russian politics; Russian energy industry; Gazprom.



Tsvetanov, E. 2015. Russian Politics or Russian Energy Industry Lobbying: European Union Perspectives. A tale of gas and politics. *Journal of Promotional Communications*, 3 (3), 340-362.

INTRODUCTION

Lobbying is often a story about the bad and the ugly. Not so long ago, a front page in *The Independent* newspaper referred to it as “all sorts of dark arts” (*The Independent*, 2011, p.1), with the article referring to the ethically questionable practice the agency Bell Pottinger was employing in order to influence political figures on behalf of its business clients.

As such, lobbying is often confined within a business context, which eliminates the chances for investigating it with respect to other fields of study. Having outlined a discrepancy in theoretical work in regards to recent events in the European arena, this research aims to investigate lobbying done by the Russian energy industry as a practice which intersects with the country's international politics.

One of the core assumptions in this paper will be that lobbying, in the context described above, is significantly influenced by the political economic narrative in which it thrives. Recent events, such as the Ukraine crisis, have sparked discussions about the Russian state and its energy industry, in the face of Gazprom, and it is often seen how the two are used as interchangeable. This makes this research endeavour interesting, as it will provide insight into a relatively undisputed field: The practices of a post-Communist country's energy industry and their effects upon the European Union. It is hoped that this research will provide the realm of professional communications with food for thought as to whether practices such as lobbying can be related to another field of academic study – international relations; it will also shed light on the importance to examine lobbying from different political economic angles.

Some of the main sub-questions that will be explored throughout will be: 1) How are Russian energy industry lobbying and Russian political economy related and what are the consequences of this relation? 2) How is lobbying perceived in relation to democracy and could this be the reason to define differences/similarities between international politics and lobbying? And 3) is Russian energy industry lobbying different from other types of lobbying in the eyes of Brussels-based communications specialists? A case-study approach, using the gas giant – *Gazprom*, will be adopted throughout when referring to the Russian energy industry.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Lobbying

The very word 'lobbying'

"takes its name from the lobbies or hallways of Parliament where MPs and peers gather before and after debates in the Commons and Lords chambers" (BBC 2015, online).

In other words, lobbying is traditionally something that takes place before and/or after an event or a series of events (Andrews, 1996); it circulates around a political happening. It should be noted that the above quote from the BBC is not definitive, but rather descriptive, outlining that in its essence, lobbying is a persuasive piece of communication.

Bearing this in mind, practitioners and scholars have attempted to further relinquish the theoretical ambiguity around lobbying. Luneberg (2005) provides a simple definition by outlining that lobbying is a practice aimed at influencing legislation. Lionel Zetter (2014), with 20 years' experience in the 'influence industry', as lobbying was termed by Cave and Rowell (2014), views lobbying as a form of persuasive communication that is undertaken by charities, trade unions, or corporations with the aim of influencing governmental decisions that are crucial for the respective lobbying agent's stakeholders. Berry (2001) further expands the theoretical framework by concluding that lobbying is "the effort of organised interests to inform policy makers and persuade them to choose particular policy measures" (p.19).

The last definition is key to understanding the importance of lobbying in a democratic society, as it represents "organised interests". In this sense, lobbying is a

practice adopted by numerous interest groups whose goal is to influence governmental policymaking (Hill, 1997). Normatively, this position suggests lobbying as being crucial for the democratic values sustained in a capitalist democracy.

Moloney (1996), from the vantage point adopted further in this research paper that lobbying and public relations (PR) share the same roots in the evolution of persuasive communication, goes further to conclude that there are two main perspectives of lobbying operating within a capitalist democracy.

First, from a pluralist liberal model, both lobbying and PR are beneficial to society and democracy *per se*, as they represent the interests of different stakeholder groups in a two-way communication fashion. Being a form of two-way communication, lobbying represents a dialogue, often mutually-beneficial (Grunig, 1984; Lerbinger, 2006; Botan and Hazelton, 2010) and required as a basis for the *modus operandi* of democratic society.

The other model Moloney (1996) examines is diametrically opposed to the first one. It is ideologically neo-Marxist and was developed to serve the belief that lobbying, and PR, serve monopoly capitalism (Smythe, 1971, quoted in Moloney, 1996), and rely heavily on information subsidy – “the provision of ready-to-use newsworthy information”, as outlined by Gandy (1981, p.103). It is apparent that this form of lobbying is more intrusive in nature; it does not rely as much on mutually-beneficial dialogues, rather it has evolved from a form of persuasive communication to a tool of coercive operation, as some scholars refer to it specifically in the context of US political economy (Mahoney, 2008; Coen and Richardson, 2009; Coen, 2013). In this fashion, it would suffice to say that lobbying resorts to two-way communication techniques only to serve the one-dimensional interests of its hiring agent (Cave and Rowell, 2014). This theoretical foundation will be the core assumption of the researcher’s endeavours further in this paper. Drawing conclusion upon these two theoretical frameworks will help this author to determine the Russian energy industry’s influence efforts when targeted at the European Union (EU).

One of the reasons why there is a disparity in scholars’ perspectives on lobbying is the lack of solid criteria against which lobbying and its original intents and consequent effects upon society can be measured. Grunig (1984) examines the influence on industry from a liberal standpoint: Lobbying is deemed central to the democratic operations as stated in the American Constitution (“Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”). Other scholars, such as Gandy (1981) and Nownes (2013), argue that lobbying is strictly ideological and thus it relies on information subsidy to provide policymakers with biased information on a subject of interest (Cave and Rowell, 2014; John, 2002).

Regardless of the position one is to take on critical theory, there are two key perspectives to be taken into consideration from the above: 1) lobbying is a practice present in most developed democracies, and 2) its effects upon these democracies are investigated through the prism of the political economic narrative lobbying is practised within. With respect to this, delving into the literature on political economy will be fundamental in encapsulating lobbying’s nature (Duhe and Sriramesh, 2009); its differences and similarities with international politics.

Gilpin (2001) proposed three dimensions of political economy that can be directly applied to the case of the “influence industry”, used as a synonym for lobbying in this paper: a) the primary purpose of the economic activity of the nation, b) the role of the state in the economy, and c) the structure of the corporate sector and private

business practices. These assumptions will be helpful in explaining the effects of the political economic narrative upon lobbying done by Russia and targeted at the EU.

Political economy

Although the term political economy in the 18th century referred to the economies of state, through the 19th century it increasingly gained its own academic recognition by exemplifying the interplay between the business and the state. Groewnege (1987) notes that, in the western world, economics has become the term to replace political economy as the “recognised name of a science” (p. 905). This highlights the fact that political economy was increasingly being used as a term describing not only economic, but also social phenomena, although the economic perspective remained dominant (Heath, 2010; Duhe and Sriramesh, 2009).

Nonetheless, any researcher should be careful when examining the use of the term “political economy”, as it is highly context-bound. Wielczynski (1977) indicates that “[u]p until the mid-1950s, the science of economics, or ‘political economy’, in Socialist countries was in a deplorable state. Most thinkers believed that there was little scope for independent study of economics in the context of a Socialist planned economy.” (p. 29). Ever since Alfred Marshall’s *Principles of Economics* (1890) was published, the western world standardised the use of the term economics, while “political economy” was reserved for the Marxist and classical treatment of economics (Lange, 1959). In Eastern Europe, Russia included, both terms have been used variably. Generally, even before the Communist takeover, ‘political economy’ was mostly used in reference to post-classical capitalist economics (Pohorille, 1968; Wielczynski, 1977), with a tendency to use ‘economics’ interchangeably.

Although it is historically evident that political economy was primarily used as a reference to what is nowadays called ‘economics’, currently in the western world political economy is, most crudely, defined as the relationship, or also interplay, between business and politics (Gilpin, 2001). This will be the default definition by which the term will be used throughout this paper.

To understand the mechanics behind the current political economy of Russia, a researcher must first understand the society from which this condition emerged: Communism (Hettne, 1994). Although by no means adopting a Marxist perspective, this interpretation of political economy will be helpful in determining the interrelations between the Russian energy industry and the country’s political interests.

Gilpin (2001) noted that

“[t]he ways in which world economy functions are determined by both markets and the policies of nation-states, especially those of powerful states” (p.23).

Although the author makes no explicit clarification what is meant by “powerful states” – powerful in relation to the business in the same country or powerful in terms of influence on the international arena – it is certain to say that in both cases the Russian state fulfils the requirements. Bearing this in mind, the energy industry plays a vital role in defining the politics-business interaction in the country.

As a post-Communist Eastern European country (Cornillie and Frankhauser, 2004), the energy industry has proven vital for policymaking due to its importance in defining international policies related specifically to the energy markets or even focused on global affairs (Lough, 2011; Aron, 2013). Thus it is imperative to understand that the energy industry herein should not be regarded as a mere business tool, but as a potential instrument for political influence in the international arena.

The country's gas giant, *Gazprom* – which will be used as the face of the Russian energy industry in this paper, has the state as its major stakeholder with 50+1% (Gazprom, 2015). Thus, the underlying question becomes: Can lobbying in the west be same as lobbying in Russia when the politics and business are different terms in both environments?

This question is linked with academic attempts to describe the differences between a number of capitalist economies. In the west, business is often the dominant paradigm (Duverger, 1974) and politics is often subdued to it, as the former claims to represent the interests of the people (Friedman, 1953). In post-Communist countries, however, the scenario can be different. Although the west is not unfamiliar with government-owned, also parastatal, corporations, for example the energy company EdF in France, in post-Communist countries the state ideology can be the overriding determinant in business strategies. Operating within a “state-directed capitalism” (Baev, 2012, p.123), practices such as lobbying become ever more complex: from a persuasive practice adopted predominantly by businesses in the west, it becomes a coercive technique used by Putin at meetings with EU leaders for instance.

By definition, state capitalism (or also state-directed capitalism) is an economic condition in which the state can be involved in for-profit activities (Raymond, 1983; Pollard, 2011; Dale 2004). It should be noted that Russia is a specifically intricate case, as scholars in the past have argued that the country never adopted socialism or capitalism as they are known in the west; rather, it operated in a closed, state-directed capitalism (Binns, 1986; Howard and King, 1989), thus resulting in a dogmatic shared ideology between the state and the business with the former being dominant in the relationship. More recently, Andrei Illarionov, one of Putin's former economic advisors, resigned in 2005 as a result of Russia's “embracement of state capitalism” (Illarionov, 2006, online).

Two scholars (Sheppard and Mandell, 2006) go even further in revoking the socialist condition of the USSR by outlining three different theories to explain the regime: 1) that USSR was a form of state capitalism, 2) that USSR was a bureaucratic collectivism marked by a new ruling class of bureaucrats, and 3) Leon Trotsky's view that the USSR was a “bureaucratically degenerated workers' state”, remaining a dictatorship of the proletariat (Sheppard and Mandell, 2006, p. 5-6). Regardless of our position on these theories, what they all have in common is the fact that the Soviet Union, and nowadays Russia, was marked by a political economy in which the relationship between business and politics was inappropriately intimate. This has led to the emergence of numerous parastatal corporations that purport the ideology of the dominant political elite (Lane, 2007).

International politics

Although the scope of this research paper does not allow for an in-depth analysis of international politics as a separate field of study, an overview of the aspects relevant specifically to the topic explored is still manageable. Therefore, this dissertation will not focus holistically on international politics; instead, it will only explore the philosophical approaches that can be applied when analysing an act of international relations, such as the annexation of a country or any other form of intervention.

Contemporary theory on international politics, from this point on defined as the field of study of relationships between countries and the roles of sovereign states (Waltz, 1954; 2010), has identified 4 philosophical approaches to analysing acts in the international arena (Clemens, 1999; Newmann, 2008). These approaches are stratified

into levels of analysis and are: system level, state level, organisational level and individual level.

System level analysis examines a sovereign state's behaviour in relation to other countries. This means that a state's action are justified as a result of what the realm of international politics requires, meaning that there can be weak and strong states. What is important here is that this philosophical approach does not recognise any business or industry necessarily as overriding determinants for a state's behaviour (Newman, 2008).

The second level of analysis is state analysis. This approach entirely justifies a state's behaviour based upon the same states characteristics – for example if it is democratic, with rough neighbouring countries, and what the main economic drives are. This level diminishes the role of business in causing international political actions (Henry, 2012).

The third level of analysis is organisational. A key variable here are businesses, as they can be the indomitable perpetrators of international political acts. In the state-business interrelation, the state is normally inferior (Yurdusev, 1993).

The fourth and final philosophical approach is the one of individual level of analysis. This one resembles totalitarian regimes: A state's international acts are justified through adopting a leader's position on an issue. Hitler's Nazi Germany and Mao Zedong's China are prime examples of such schools of political thought (Newmann, 2008).

Having outlined the core pillars of examining a state's international political acts, it is now possible to make any potential relation between lobbying and international politics.

Related studies

There is little similar research focusing on the interrelations between political economy and the influence industry – be that lobbying or PR, which are seen as closely-related in this paper. Heath (2010) concluded that “scholarly attempts to systematically link political economy with public relations have been sparse and muted” (p.701). However, it should be noted that segmented, the topic can be linked separately with studies on political economy, capitalist democracies and lobbying.

A study conducted by Rueschmeyer, Stephens & Stephens (1992) found that “quantitative cross-national comparisons of many countries... found consistently a positive correlation between development and democracy” (p. 3)

This finding helps to see current Russian capitalist democracy in a different fashion, where its democratic nuance can be attributed to an ongoing process of technological development. This further cements the notion that the political economy of Russia fosters a different breed of lobbying.

Furthermore, a number of empirical studies in the field of European interest politics (Van Schledelen, 1994; Greenwood et. al., 1992; Bennett, 1997) have concluded that the EU has a distinctly complex structure and any investigation should adopt “a case study format and a sectoral focus” (Bouen, 2011, p.1). Thus it is necessary to develop a unique theoretical framework to investigate the interaction between Russian energy business and the EU.

METHODS

Aim: To investigate from an EU perspective the relation between Russian energy industry's lobbying efforts and the Russian's state international politics in order to see if the two together represent a form of lobbying practice.

Objectives:

1. How are Russian energy industry lobbying and Russian political economy related and what are the consequences of this relation?
2. How is lobbying perceived in relation to democracy and could this be the reason to define differences/similarities between international politics and lobbying?
3. Is Russian energy industry lobbying different from other types of lobbying? How do Brussels-based policymakers and communications specialists see this?

A qualitative method approach will be applied, allowing the researcher to gain a greater depth of understanding (Sloam, 2007). As qualitative techniques focus on participants' in-depth experience, they will suit research objectives of understanding practising political communications experts' opinions. Furthermore, an interpretivist paradigm was deemed useful (Angen, 2000; Blumer, 1989) in order to investigate in-depth the personal experiences of the aforementioned. Being aware that the research scope only allows for a small-scale sample, adopting a subjectivist epistemology allowed for positing the professional biases of the interviewees (i.e. working for a specific sector from the energy industry – renewables for instance) as an existing part of the research (Berger and Luckman, 1967). Also, this research framework links the collected data to a specific political context, thus making all the gathered responses time- and situation-bound (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Lyotard, 1979).

Generating in-depth responses on a politicised issue is a strenuous task. Thus, phenomenological in-depth interviews were considered the most appropriate form of response-generation, as they would "ensure that the relevant contexts are brought into focus so that situated knowledge can be produced" (Mason, 2002, p.62). Furthermore, through interviewing the participants, gaining an in-depth understanding of their experiences is enhanced (Thompson et. al., 1989).

Once the methodology was justified, the initial research method was face-to-face in-depth semi-structured interviews. However, this methodological approach was later changed, as it did not suit the objectives of the research. Some of the reasons for this are that a politically sensitive topic is investigated and as such, it requires time on participants' behalf to phrase a well-worded answer to the interview questions, which face-to-face interview exclude. Consequently, an email-based structured interview

approach with a questionnaire was chosen. The questionnaire design used an innovative way of extracting in-depth responses through providing narrative stimuli in the questions (Proulx and Heine, 2009), thus ensuring the participants would not discredit their participation with single-worded answers. In addition to this, face-to-face interviews can “consume valuable organisational resources such as staff and time” (p.31), which in this specific case means that respondents might be unlikely to agree to participation or simply discredit the validity of their responses by avoiding in-depth discussions.

Being aware that all survey methods can be effective and useful, certain criteria related to the research questions will be crucial in filtrating the best approach to getting responses (Sarantakos, 2013). A study by Pfeifer (2000) concludes that using emails is a potent way of addressing politically sensitive topics, such as the ones in this research paper. Although this research method lacks in questionnaire complexity in comparison to face-to-face or telephone interviews, it allows for well-thought of and emotionally unbiased opinions. When the researcher is tasked with interviewing a respondent vis-à-vis, interpersonal communication plays a major factor and might often result in provoked answers (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).

Generally, online qualitative data collection is increasingly gaining popularity in a globalised world (Meho, 2006), and research by Denscombe (2003, p. 51) shows that the quality of the responses acquired through this method is much the same as those produced by traditional methods. Although Markham (1998) notes that electronic interviewing produce cryptic responses which are less in-depth, Meho (2006) indicates that

“participants interviewed via email remained more focused on the interview questions and provided more reflectively dense accounts than their face-to-face counterparts” (p. 1291).

It can be concluded that trust in online qualitative interviewing is proportionately growing with the increasing process of digitalization (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003).

Sampling

The research objectives imply that the aim of the researcher is not to ask if something is in existence; rather, how to categorise something that is already existent. Hence, the approach adopted is epistemological – it aims to investigate through certain methods the peculiarities of a present phenomenon. Following this deductive logic, a non-probabilistic purposive sampling method was deemed most suitable for examining the research questions. In this way, access to specific characteristics of the population, i.e. knowledge or expertise, was eased.

The epistemological perspective tells the researcher that people will be sampled based on their experiences and on their personal characteristics *per se* (Mason, 2002). Thus, the categories, or also variables, defining the nature of the target population from which a sample will be deducted, are expertise in the field (political communication, lobbying, European Union, energy industry) and their knowledge (of events that have occurred in the realm of political communication). These two variables were chosen as central to the research purposes with respect to the data analysis that will follow once the responses have been collected. Although mindful of being categorical to the point of searching for a universal, objective truth (Mason, 2003), once the analysis has been done, the arguing process will be approached evidentially and

interpretively. Thus, the sampling process will be crucial in demonstrating the research's validity and gathered evidence to constitute a robust analysis.

A typology of sampling strategies, developed by Patton (1990) hints at maximum variation as the approach that best fits a small-scale study with a focus on critical enquiry (Fay, 1987) that aims to examine social phenomena from different perspectives as most appropriate. Adopting this research practice means that diverse variations will be documented, thus allowing the investigator to get a wide range of opinion (Patton, 1990). With respect to this, 6 political communications experts working in Brussels were interviewed, with one of them consequently refusing participation in this project. Thus, the number of actual respondents – 5 – was considered most suitable so, as the research paper is resource- and time-bound, meaning that if more people participate in the interview process, large sections of their responses might be omitted due to a strictly limited word count. This would cripple the data analysis, further diminishing the purpose of the qualitative approach.

Participants in this research project decided to remain anonymous. Nevertheless, below is presented a table with relevant data about their professional background, without breaching the anonymisation clause, and a coded section with the participants' names further to be used in this paper.

Research name	Organisation type	Position
Participant A	Energy trade association	Chief Policy Officer
Participant B	Global PR and PA agency with an office in Brussels	Director of Public Affairs
Participant C	Platform for energy policy analysis and news outlet in Brussels	Founder
Participant D	EU Member State national trade association	President
Participant E	A global NGO with headquarters in Brussels	Associate, Energy Policy

Validity

A score of authors (Drew and Heritage, 1996; Lamnek, 1993, Terhardt, 1981) propose a common set of criteria for validity of methodology: cumulative validation, communicative validation, argumentative validation, and ecological validation (Sarantakos, 2006). These validation tactics, however, might not be suitable for every type of research, as argued by Miles and Huberman (1994). The research questions will be central in determining the validity of the research, as the objective is to produce relevant, precise and accurate findings based on the main research question. Thus, validity is claimed through the use of research methodology and methods, which consequently generated valid qualitative data.

An email-based structured approach was preferred, which allowed the participants to address the questions in a time suitable for them, giving them the possibility to phrase responses well for a topic of political complexity, and last but not least – was cost and time-efficient (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Although some scholars (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; Mason, 2002) note that the structured form of this approach poses a threat to response validity, this has been combated by probing on questions that required further clarifications.

Trustworthiness

Trustworthiness, defined here as the “[d]emonstration that the evidence for the results reported is sound and the argument made based on the results is strong” (LaBanca, 2010, online), was considered in this research project as opposed to the notion of reliability. As Mason (2002) notes

“conventional measures of reliability are more comfortably associated with quantitative research where standardised ‘research instruments’ are used than they are with qualitative research” (p.187).

To limit the researcher’s bias on the topic, thematic analysis and phenomenological reduction (bracketing) were used for the analysis. These allowed for separating the findings from a predetermined interpretative framework, thus reducing the risk of personal values, of the researcher and the participants, influencing research findings (Bryman, 2012).

All respondents were required to sign a consent form and obtain a participant information sheet prior to participating in the research to ensure that data was collected ethically and in check with academic standards.

Limitations

A limitation in this methodology is that the type of sampling is not representative of the entire population. Nevertheless, this is not a major concern for this research project, as the research questions do not aim at addressing the issue ontologically, or otherwise – making exhaustive, general statements.

Another limitation outlined here is the low transferability of the research findings owed to the small-scale of the research and the context inclinations – the project is focused on a very specific political realm (Gillis and Jackson, 2002). Nonetheless, the purpose of this research paper is not to produce general conclusions, but rather to provide a preliminary insight into a potentially growing area of interest for both practitioners and scholars.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The following section will focus on the key findings from the fieldwork. As such, a non-biased description of data will be presented through implementing interviewees’ responses where appropriate. Throughout the description section, where responses by different participants were incorporated as complementary to each other, this was only done after carefully outlining recurrent topics in the different answers. In the case of disagreement between interviewees regarding certain answers, this was explicitly mentioned.

After each investigated theme, a discussion section will follow, where the main findings will be analysed.

Theme 1 – Lobbying and political economy: What is lobbying?

All were inclined to believe that lobbying is a practice aimed at influencing political decisions. They were unanimous in suggesting that lobbying is not solely conducted by businesses, but political institutions as well. Participant A narrates:

In my view, lobbying is not just influenced by politics; it exists in order to influence politics and policies. Its role is to defend the interest of any business or public interest group.

It is suggested in the response above that by “public interest”, anyone can lobby a political institution. Lobbying does not seem to be about who is doing it, but instead who it is aimed at. As such, lobbying resembles a link for influence between politics and business or any other group representing a public interest. Participant B confirms:

Lobbying for me is about exerting influence over the political agenda, businesses are only one in a myriad of players lobbying. NGOs lobby, governments lobby, trade unions lobby, etc, etc.

An interesting finding is that those participants with substantial knowledge of lobbying in post-Communist countries are of the opinion that the interrelations between business and politics nurture the interests of an elitist group.

Participant C, who has been working in the energy industry in both Brussels and one post-Communist country, not Russia, narrates:

I believe that some of those [post-Communist] countries may have less transparent ways of doing business and creating policies than western countries, thus enabling business to influence politics in a stronger way.

This indicates the existence of a mutually-beneficial relationship between those in power and those in fortune in post-Communist countries. In such an environment, notions of lobbying, business and politics differ from those in the West. Participant B further adds:

There is more cronyism – so govt friends do well when their friends are in power. It is exacerbated in Russia as power does not change hands ever. It is not to say that there is no cronyism in the west, there is, but it's less visible.

You need to know someone on the 'inside' e.g. I can lobby on any topic in Brussels with arguments and strategy. In some countries it is all about who you know and how well they like you. It is not the case to the same degree in Brussels.

The responses given to this section of the questionnaire were used to identify key notions of lobbying and its presence within a given political economic narrative. What became evident was that for Brussels-based communications professionals, Russia's political past has severed the differences between the energy business and politics, thus nearly creating an amalgam of politico-industrial interests. Lobbying, business and politics are different things in post-Communist countries. Ergo, it is hard to galvanise any substantial re-definitions of these key terms in the given socio-political environment. Consequently, lobbying in this context is no longer defined by those who conduct it, but rather by those who are targeted – political figures.

Whereas for western academics and practitioners (Zetter, 214; Berry, 2001; Cave and Rowell, 2014) lobbying is more or less confined within a business context and as such it exists to create a dialogue, be that beneficial or not, between politics and the business, in post-Communist countries a lobbyist can be anyone with sufficient power to influence the political agenda. This finding undermines the understanding that lobbying could be seen primarily as a mutually-beneficial link between business and political entities. This research confirms that while western practitioners largely rely on increasingly transparent lobbying practices, in post-Communist countries transparency is challenged and seemingly impossible to enhance: Western countries can aim to improve transparency between business and politics, as the two are essentially different entities. In the post-Communist world, however, transparency is a relative term, which lacks in essence. As a consequence of this, lobbying in the energy field can resort to practices beyond those accepted as professional in the west.

This tells us that a unilateral understanding of lobbying is impossible due to the different environments in which it exists. Gilpin (2001), along with Duhe and Sriramesh (2009), do touch upon the need to examine further the links between lobbying and other forms of professional communication in relation to the political economic narrative. This, coupled with the findings from this research, draws us to reconsider theoretical understandings of lobbying as a mutually-beneficial form of communication (Grunig, 1984). Applying a one-size-fits-all approach to theorising lobbying could diminish certain aspects of the practice, such as positing it within a realistic professional framework. Broadly, western scholars tend to refer to corporate lobbying instead of other realms of the practice – lobbying done by political institutions for instance. This inevitably raises questions about how communications practices, similar to the ones investigated in this paper, can be defined: Is it theoretical pragmatism that has constrained understandings of lobbying within certain fields of study thus eliminating the chances for enriching communications from other fields – international politics for example? Although there needs to be done more substantial research to underpin any such statements, this project indicates that lobbying needs to be investigated through different angles so as to encapsulate its essence holistically.

Theme 2 - Lobbying and democracy

There were different views regarding lobbying and its effects upon liberal democracies. Participant A and E indicated that in a capitalist society, lobbying can essentially become a powerful tool in the hands of those who have the money – a view supported by Gandy (1982) and Nownes (2013). In this way, lobbying could be used to create an imbalance in the policymaking process. This view is somewhat supported by participant C, who suggested that the effects of lobbying upon democratic society should be judged by directly focusing on the policy processes that have been influenced and how they have been beneficial to society, noting:

In some cases lobbying can have a positive nature, informing and providing the state with advice on developments in a particular sector, thus leading to its growth by facilitating proper policy making.

On the other hand, if the information is manipulated to mis-inform the policymakers and its purpose is only the interest of a particular group, without regard to state's development as a whole then it is harmful.

A somewhat stark contrast to this opinion is exemplified by participants B and D. They indicate that lobbying is a beneficial activity to democratic society, as it provides policymakers with sufficient information which they can lack. The latter could seriously damage the fair policymaking process, thus crippling democratic society with informed choices. Participant B narrates:

Lobbying is vital to a democratic society. Having transparency is important too, but policymakers need information and evidence to make decisions.

They often lack this – and relying on one source will lead to failure of policymaking.

If lobbying is about providing businesses with an edge over competitors why are there so many trade associations in Brussels?

This participant seemed to view transparency as something of secondary importance and inferior to providing stakeholders with multiple views. In this sense, lobbying, although often lacking in transparency, has positive effects upon policymaking and democratic society *per se*, as it helps for making well-informed choices.

Regardless of where participants stood on the matter in question, one thing was clear from all responses: Lobbying has a profound effect upon democratic society in the sense that it can bring changes. To understand lobbying is to see that the knowledge it produces is inter-penetrated with power. Thus, lobbying is herein described not as a tool for creating positive or negative policies, but as a tool that has the potential to influence the power relations between all institutions and players involved in a democratic society.

Further in the questionnaire, participants were unequivocal that lobbying is closely related to PR. Whether or not lobbying (or PR) is an activity that aims to create mutually-beneficial relations between an organisation and its stakeholders, however, is a different matter. There are generally two opposing views on this matter in the findings: One suggests that lobbying is ideological in its essence and it may be detrimental to democratic processes as it might misinform policymakers, which is confirmed by previous research by Moloney (1996), Gandy (1982), and John (2002). The other view, predominantly supported by people with experience in consultancy, is that lobbying helps for creating mutually-beneficial relations between stakeholders, as the government on its own would fail in creating a fair-for-all policy that has been informed by all stakeholders. This description of lobbying's practices again supports the

understanding that it is a tool that can exert influence upon the power relations between institutions and stakeholders.

In order to argue if the example with the Russian energy industry is representative of lobbying activities or international politics, it is logical to measure these activities against the criteria set for the persuasive communication practices. If we accept that lobbying belongs to the field of PR, which is the case with this research project, then the Russian energy industry efforts in the international arena can be tested by placing it into a communications paradigm, which outlines the interrelations between lobbying and democracy. This paradigm resembles James Grunig's infamous two-way communication model (1984), which suggests that persuasive communication industries are adept at creating mutually-beneficial dialogues between stakeholders, thus enabling both sides to reach a feasible agreement and eventually it is positive to democracy.

Participants in the study judged the influence industry's merits in a democratic society by focusing on the policy results that have been invoked due to lobbying activities. In this sense, lobbying is necessary for the operations of the democratic state – a view supported by Grunig (1984) and also Zetter (2013). What is new in this research, however, is the fact that people not only describe lobbying as positive to democracy, they explained that it is 'natural'. This position, nonetheless, belongs to the thinking of a positivist or ethicist. If the same position is put into a different epistemological category – the one of post-modernism – then lobbying is a nothing but a practice that has the potential to alter power relations in a democratic society. Only a few such claims have been made in the communications theory on lobbying, which is perhaps owed to the investigations conducted in these fields: They are predominantly done within a national context, likely the UK or USA. When viewed internationally, however, lobbying, according to the findings herein, becomes a ramification of democracy that changes the socio-political order of the same democratic society through interfering in the power relations of all players involved. Informed by the findings, this conclusion creates a notion that interlinks lobbying with other fields, focused on examining power relations internationally: International politics.

This draws attention to a particular aspect - is then lobbying, such as the one done by the Russian energy industry, evolving to the extent of becoming related to the field of international politics? Participants are of the opinion that when lobbying is done internationally, yet in an EU context, it is possible for it to resemble the acts of foreign affairs due to *Gazprom's* state ownership. Crumley (2009) touches upon this by referring to *Gazprom's* communications activities as acts of international diplomacy, although the author was making clear references to the gas crises of 2007-8.

Findings from this research further suggest that communications professionals are increasingly viewing lobbying as closely related to international relations especially in the presence of political phenomena, such as the EU-Russia tensions from 2007-8 and the Ukraine crisis from 2014. Therefore, it can be concluded that there are changes in the nature of lobbying when it is appropriately examined through the prism of different political economic narratives, which can attribute to lobbying features from other fields, such as international politics. If 'traditional' lobbying can actually change, will be a core topic in the next section.

Theme 3 – Russian energy industry lobbying and Russian international politics:

The evolution of lobbying

The third theme in the interviews is focused on investigating the changes lobbying has undergone in the past. This will be helpful in creating an overall sense of its nature - can lobbying change, does it change, and if yes - how so. Another aspect of this section is the lobbying efforts by the Russian energy industry, in the face of *Gazprom*, and Russia's international affairs attempts in the European arena - are they similar to lobbying practices and, if yes, how so.

All participants agree that *Gazprom's* conventional communication tactics are proactive and often seem 'aggressive' compared to those of others energy lobby groups. Participant B notes:

I am invited regularly for Champions League football matches – you can only imagine what they offer people who are really influential.

Although such gestures were considered daily round before, the same participant notes that other lobby groups are not as generous any longer:

It's (Lobbying is) less lavish than it was – fewer big parties and big

lunches. This reflects the age of austerity – we only drink water at lunch

these days...

Gazprom seems to be old-fashion in the lobbying sense that they do not respect the legally-binding "cap" on giving presents to political figures related to EU legislation, which states that a present cannot exceed the sum of €150 (EU Academy, 2015).

Participant A, however, notes something different from the rest of the interviewees:

Again, the only experience I have is a letter I received from Gazprom

myself. I had made a statement about fossil fuels in general, and Gazprom

found rather strong words asking me to re-consider my view because gas

was different.

This finding leads the researcher to think that *Gazprom's* lobbying efforts are a priori different from those of similar lobby groups. By default, the gas giant's communications activities are deemed intrusive at best, which gives the sense that the organisation is ready to do considerably more than other similar businesses in the pursuit of its interests.

Following this logic, it is only natural to ask oneself: Is lobbying in this field changing? Participant D narrates:

Introduction of a more transparent legal framework and a raise in the

awareness of the public and the media made lobbyists more careful of

their actions and this can be of benefit to the community, of course there

are still efforts aimed at promoting only the interests of particular groups,

but lobbying has certainly evolved.

All participants are of the opinion that lobbying, in a European context, is increasingly becoming more transparent. Another key feature of its evolution is the fact that you no longer need to organise lavish dinner parties. Rather, an official meeting in the office is considered the golden practice. If this finding is linked with the participants' views on *Gazprom's* lobbying efforts, it is evident that although lobbying by other organisation (or institutions) in the EU has changed, *Gazprom's* communications efforts have retained their provocative status through the use of lobbying practices deemed harsh.

Russia's international politics

Focusing on what is seen as Russia's international politics, participants were convinced that the Russian state is defensive in its strategies. It aims at minimising risk before it has turned into a potential crisis, thus proving to be proactive, instead of reactive.

This gives the sense that the Russian state would actively seek its interests' fulfilment in the international arena. Russia was described by participants C, D and E as adamant in its position with the EU, especially in light of recent events such as the Ukraine crisis. Participant B adds:

Russia is truly of a defensive nature. It sees threats and tries to neutralize them before they can impact Russia. Keeping places like Georgia and Ukraine destabilized suits them, if they start to try to join NATO etc. which the Russians constitute as a threat. From the Cold War to now my view is that they always want a buffer with the west as this is where most invasions have come from.

It is apparent from this excerpt that the Russian state's diplomacy tactics could resort to "invasions", which is coincidentally what happened with the Crimea in 2014, when Russia annexed the peninsula with the justification that the intervention was necessary so as to protect the ethnically Russian population living there (Englund, 2014). This justification is challenged in participants' responses, as they believe the state had other interests to preserve.

Nevertheless, when the interviewees were asked if the Ukraine crisis had proved economically beneficial to the Russian energy industry, responses were not unanimous. One participant decided not to address this question, while the others agreed that the energy industry, in the face of *Gazprom*, could not find strong supporters within the EU to continue major gas pipeline projects, such as the failed South Stream, and thus the project had become economically unfeasible, as participants D and E explicitly stated.

When participants were speaking of the Russian state's recent international politics (since the Ukraine crisis), there were recurrent themes similar to those found in their descriptions of *Gazprom's* communications efforts. These themes were related to the cardinal features shared by both the state and the country's energy lobby – from being aggressive and proactive to remaining stubborn and uncommunicative. Only one participant (notably the one who had received the threatening letter from *Gazprom*), refused to address the question related to Russia's international policy manners.

To see if Russian energy industry lobbying is different from the rest, participants were additionally asked if other energy lobby groups' communications activities

resemble *Gazprom's*. The overall verdict was that, although there are other large energy companies that are parastatal, their lobbying efforts are dissimilar with *Gazprom's*. Participant A narrates:

In the communications and lobbying strategies, I see Vattenfall behaving like other energy utilities in Europe. Even though the Swedish government has a strong impact on Vattenfall's technology choices, I would never expect Vattenfall to play a role in foreign and security issues like Gazprom did in the European gas crises.

For EdF, I believe that the influence on (and from) the national government is quite strong and the lobby work may be less visible than for other companies with less direct government access.

Only the French EdF, owned entirely by the state (EdF, 2015), comes somewhat close to *Gazprom*. Other participants also mentioned EdF in their responses, although they did not consider them to be as proactive as *Gazprom*.

Investigating any potential relationship between international politics and lobbying requires a theoretical understanding of both fields. Although the scope of this research project limits the options for exploring both topics in-depth at the same time, an analysis through the discourse of international politics will be helpful inasmuch as only focusing on how acts in the international arena are justifiable.

It is evident from interviewees' responses that Russia is perceived as a highly proactive state when presented in the international arena. This leads the researcher to believe that the country's interests come first in the face of international relations. When such a state is the major shareholder of an energy company, such as *Gazprom*, the anticipated results are: Business-bolstered political decisions that aim to protect 1) the interest of its energy industry, as it 2) is one of the main income generators for the state, and 3) is a powerful tool for exerting influence over international entities. If the state's international relations actions are put into a theoretical paradigm from the same field of study, a level of analysis approach can be undertaken to see how such action can be categorised, if they can at all.

From the collected responses, it becomes clear that Russia does not fall solely into any of the four types of international relations analyses, outlined in Section 1.4 from the Literature review: systems level, state level, organisational level and individual level. All of these analyses focus on the unequivocal dominance in the inter-relations of a) the state, b) the powerful business sector, or c) the political leader who applies a totalitarian model of rule.

As participants clearly outlined that *Gazprom* is a powerful tool for exerting control over other nations, it is increasingly being more recognised as an independent player along with the state. This is supported in a journal by Simonova (2008), which outlines that Russian delegates are often joined by *Gazprom* representatives in international talks, even though some of these talks might not be exclusively related to the energy industry. Therefore, it is logical to say that *Gazprom* has gained more recognition in the interdependent relations with the state. This excludes a systems level

and individual analyses, as these focus on the state and head of the state respectively as the prime decision-makers in international affairs.

Nonetheless, participants also claimed that the state, although recognising incrementally the importance of the energy industry as a separate entity, is yet *primus inter pares*, or first amongst equals, meaning that the Russian state has retained its upper-hand position in relation to the energy industry. This excludes state level and organisational level analyses, as the two stress the exclusive omnipotence of either the business (organisational level) or the political elite (state level).

Previous research by Perovic et al. (2009) and Smith (2004) suggests that the Russian government often resorts to the energy industry to enhance the state's power and repress society's functionality in the political life of the country, as well as influence other nations. This research, however, suggests differently: There is a tendency for the Russian state to be increasingly more equal to its energy industry, especially when operating in the international arena. Thus, it is apparent that Russia's international relations cannot be categorised in accordance with conventional theory from the respective field, as also explicitly noted by (Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2008). As a result, a different framework needs to be developed so as to provide insight into the country's international relations with other nations based upon energy affairs and lobbying efforts. This framework needs to consider Russia's energy industry diplomacy and its effects upon international politics.

Further to this conclusion, what is also evident from the responses is that lobbying is a tangible practice that changes over time. Nonetheless, Russian energy industry lobbying has retained its old-fashioned tactics with lavish presents and occasional strong-worded written reminders. The findings from Theme 3 suggest that the lack of tactics change in *Gazprom's* lobbying efforts is owed to Russia's political past. Post-Communism has instilled a political economic narrative that directly reflects upon the lobbying practices in the country today. As a result, the gas giant *Gazprom* does not respond to the lobbying regulations set up by the EU (such as the cap on presents, outlined earlier).

CONCLUSIONS

This research project has identified some lobbying perspectives that cannot fall into conventional categories of communications theory, such as the two-way communication model proposed by Grunig (1984). Nevertheless, the scope of the research is minute in the myriad of projects that can be conducted in order to examine lobbying in greater depth, using aspects of other theoretical frameworks such as the ones of international relations and political economy. Unlike previous research, primarily focused on lobbying done nationally and within a western political economic narrative, this paper highlights the importance of different political economic frameworks, their effects upon lobbying, and the interdependencies thereof between international politics and lobbying practices.

The collected data shows that lobbying changes over time, just like the socio-political contexts we experience. Thus, lobbying internationally cannot be attributed the same features as lobbying nationally, and only in specific political economic contexts. Applying a one-size-fits-all model to lobbying risks misinterpreting lobbying-related activities as politically independent actions. The findings indicate that thinking of lobbying as a strictly business-confined practice is not realistic. Political lobbying, or

lobbying done by political figures and institutions, needs to be examined in further depth to see its differences and similarities with corporate lobbying.

Adopting a new theoretical understanding of lobbying can help to investigate it in relation to democracy. Depending on the philosophical approach we undertake in reasoning our arguments, the effects of lobbying on democratic society can be judged by its impact upon policy processes or its effects upon the power relations between all involved institutions and figures in a political economic narrative. The findings suggest that when lobbying, within this research's context, is explored through a post-modernist epistemological approach, it is incrementally intersecting with the field of international relations, thus showing its tendency to adapt to different socio-political environments. Logically, it would suffice to say that the Russia's international politics have the tendency to resemble the country's energy industry lobbying efforts, thus covering the aim of this research.

The scope of the presented research was small in range and size. Further research can be conducted in the field of international relations to identify if there are other recurrent patterns with lobbying. This would prove helpful in outlining any interdependencies between the two fields of study and enhance theoretical understandings of communications.

Although there were intersections between the lobbying and international relations, these were identified in a very narrow context: Conducted at EU level and by the energy industry of only one country with a Communist past. Other areas need to be explored to see if any such patterns can be indicated there too.

Further research into the lobbying-democracy relationship can also be instrumental in providing insight into the evolution of lobbying and its place within the respective political economic narrative. Last, but not least, a more in-depth approach should be considered in research focused on examining the relations between lobbying and the political economy of post-Communist countries or the EU. Although this research has only scratched the surface in this area, it suggests that fruitful findings could be made.

REFERENCES

- Andrews, L. 1996. *The relationship of political marketing to political lobbying: An examination of the Devonport campaign for the Trident refitting contract*. Available from: <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/03090569610149809> [Accessed 25.03.2015]
- Angen, M. 2000. Evaluating Interpretive Inquiry: Reviewing the Validity Debate and Opening the Dialogue. Available from: <http://qhr.sagepub.com/content/10/3/378.short> [Accessed 02.04.2015]
- BBC, 2015. *Lobbying*. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/82529.stm [Accessed 28.03.2015]
- Bennett, R. 1997. *The impact of European economic integration on business associations: the UK case*. West European Politics.
- Berger, P. L. & Luckman, T. 1967. *The Social Construction of Reality*. Garden City: Doubleday.
- Berry, J. 2001. *Lobbying*. *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioural Science*. Oxford: Elsevier.
- Blumer, H. 1989. *Herbert Blumer on the Possibility of Science in the Practice of Sociology: Further Thoughts*. Available from: <http://jce.sagepub.com/content/18/2/160.refs> [Accessed 03.04.2015]

- Botan, C. and Hazelton, V. 2010. *Public Relations Theory II*. London: Routledge.
- Bouwen, P. 2011. *Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access*. Journal of European Public Policy. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501760210138796#preview> [Accessed 23.03.2015]
- Bryman, A., 2012. *Social Research Methods*. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cave, T. and Rowell, A. 2014. *A Quiet Word. Lobbying, Crony Capitalism and Broken Politics in Britain*. London: The Bodley Head.
- Clemens, W. 2004. *Dynamics of International Relations*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Coen, D. 2007. *Empirical and Theoretical Studies in EU Lobbying*. Journal of European Public Policy. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501760701243731#preview> [Accessed 21.03.2015]
- Crabtree, B. and Miller, M. 1992. *Doing Qualitative Research*. London: Sage.
- Crumley, B. 2009. *Russia's Gazprom Diplomacy: Turning Off Europe's Heat*. Time. Available from: <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1870111,00.html> [Accessed 29.04.2015]
- Dale, G. 2004. *Between State Capitalism and Globalisation: The Collapse of the East German Economy*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Darlington, Y. & Scott, D. 2002. *Qualitative Research in Practice: Stories from the Field*. Available from: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02615470309135?journalCode=cswe20> [Accessed 18.03.2015]
- Denscombe, M. 2003. *Communities of Practice: A Research Paradigm for the Mixed Methods*. Available from: <http://www.brown.uk.com/teaching/HEST5001/denscombe.pdf> [Accessed 03.04.2015]
- Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. 2005. *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*. London: Sage.
- Drew, P. and Heritage, J. 1992. *Analysing Talk at Work: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Duhe, S. and Sriramesh, K. 2009. *Political Economy and Public Relations: A blueprint for future research*. Public Relations Review.
- Duverger, M. 1974. *Modern Democracies: Economic Power Versus Political Power*. Hinsdale: Dryden Press.
- EdF. 2015. Live Share Movements. Available from: <http://shareholders-and-investors.edf.com/edf-share/edf-share-price/live-share-movements-42683.html> [Accessed 23.04.2015]
- Englund, W. 2014. *Kremlin says Crimea is now officially part of Russia after treaty signing, Putin speech*. The Washington Post. Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-putin-prepares-to-annex-crimea/2014/03/18/933183b2-654e-45ce-920e-4d18c0ffec73_story.html [Accessed 03.05.2015]
- EU Academy. 2015. *EU Lobbying, Ethics and Transparency: "Do's and Don'ts" Transcript*. Available from: <http://www.eu-academy.eu/freeresources/eu-lobbying-ethics-and-transparency-do-s-and-dont-s/> [Accessed 02.05.2015]
- Fay, B. 1987. *Critical Social Science: Liberation from its Limits*. Available from: <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2780980?uid=3738032&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21106839150353>. [Accessed 05.04.2015]
- Friedman, M. 1953. *Essays in Positive Economics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gazprom, 2015. *Shares*. Available from: <http://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/>

[Accessed 26.04.2015]

Gillis, A., and Jackson, M. J., 2002. *Research: Methods and interpretation*. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis.

Gilpin, R. 2001. *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Glaser, Barney G. and Anselm Strauss.1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.

Greenwood, J., Grote, J. and Ronit, K. 1992. *Organized Interests and the European Community* London: Sage Publications.

Heath, R. 2010. *The Sage Handbook of Public Relations*. London: Sage.

Henry, N. 2012. *Perspectives on International Relations*. London: McGraw Hill.

Hill, M. 1997. *The Policy Process in the Modern State*. London: Prentice Hall.

Howard, M. and King, J. 1989. State Capitalism in the Soviet Union. Available from: <http://www.hetsa.org.au/pdf/34-A-08.pdf> [Accessed 04.03.2015]

John, S. 2002. *The Persuaders. When Lobbyists Matter*. New York: Palgrave.

Kirby, R. K., 2008. *Phenomenology and the Problems of Oral History*. *Oral History Review*, 35 (1), 22-38.

LaBanca, F. 2010. *In Search of Scientific Creativity: The Weblog of Frank LaBanca, Ed.D.* Available from: <http://thisismybrainonresearch.blogspot.co.uk/2012/08/valid-reliable-and-trustworthy-all.html> [Accessed 27.04.2015]

Lamnek, S. 1993. *Qualitative Sozialforschung. Band 1: Methodologie*. Weinheim: Verlags Union.

Lane, D. 2007. The transformation of Russia: The role of the political Élite. *Journal of Europe-Asia Studies*. Available from:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668139608412366?journalCode=ceas20#.VRq-F_x4o7I [Accessed 19.2015]

Lange, O. 1959. *Political Economy*. Warsaw: PWN.

Lerbinger, O. 2006. *Corporate Public Affairs: Interacting With Interest Groups, Media, and Government*. London: Routledge.

Liotard, J. 1979. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Available from: <https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/lyotard.htm> [Accessed 27.03.2015]

Marshall, A. 1890. *The Principles of Economics*. Available online:

<http://digamo.free.fr/marshall90.pdf> [Accessed 27.03.2015]

Mason, J. 2002. *Qualitative Researching*. London: Sage.

Meek, R. 1977. *Smith, Marx & After. Ten Essays in the Development of Economic Thought*. London: Chapman & Hall.

Meho, L.2006. Email Interviewing in Qualitative Research: A Methodological Discussion. Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/asi.20416/abstract>. [Accessed 02.04.2015]

Miles, M & Huberman, M. 1994. *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Handbook*. London: Sage.

Moloney, K. 1996. *Lobbyists for Hire*. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing.

Newmann, B. 2008. A Brief Introduction to International Relations and Foreign Policy. Available from: <http://www.people.vcu.edu/~wnewmann/468theory.htm> [Accessed 01.05.2015]

Nownes, A. 2013. *Interest Groups in American Politics*. New York: Routledge.

Patton, M.Q.1990. *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*. 2nd ed. California: Sage.

- Perovic, J., Wenger, A. and Ortung, R. 2009. *The Foundations of Russia's Stability*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pfeifer, L. 2000. *Basic Sociology: Improved Edition*. Warsaw: PWE.
- Pohorille, M. 1968. *The Political Economy of Socialism*. Warsaw: PWE.
- Pollard, V. 2011. *State Capitalism, Contentious Politics and Large-Scale Social Change*. New York: BRILL.
- Proulx, T. & Heine, S. 2009. Connections from Kafka. Available from: <http://pss.sagepub.com/content/20/9/1125> [Accessed 01.04.2015]
- Richardson, J. 2006. *Policy-making in the EU: interests, ideas and garbage cans of primeval soup*. New York: Routledge.
- Sarantakos, S. 2013. *Social Research*. London: Palgrave.
- Sheppard, B. and Mandel, E. 2006. *State Capitalism: A Marxist Critique of a False Theory*. London: Resistance Books.
- Simonova, K. 2008. Россия 2008. Отчет информации. Подготовлен Центром политической конъюнктуры. Available from: <http://www.forum-ekonomiczne.pl/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Simonovs-Report.-Russian-Version.pdf> [Accessed 22.04.2015]
- Smith, K. 2004. *Russian Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland, and Ukraine: A New Stealth Imperialism?* London: CSIS.
- Sloam, J., 2007. *Rebooting Democracy: Youth Participation in Politics in the UK*. *Parliamentary Affairs*
- Terhardt, E. 1981. Institution-Interpretation-Argumentation. *Zeitschrift der Paedagogik*.
- Thompson, C.J., Locander, W.B., and Pollio, H.R., 1989. *Putting Consumer Experience Back into Consumer Research: The Philosophy and Method of Existential-Phenomenology*. *Journal of Consumer Research* [online], 16(2), 133–146.
- Tsygankov, A. and Tsygankov, P. (2008) National Ideology and IR Theory: Three Incarnations of the "Russian Idea." Paper presented at an annual meeting of International Studies Association, San Francisco
- Van Schendelen, M. 1994. *National Public and Private EC Lobbying*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Waltz, K. 1954. *Man, State and War*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz, K. 2010. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Waverland Press.
- Wielczynski, J. 1977. *The Economics of Socialism*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Yurdusev, N. 1993. *Level of Analysis and Unit of Analysis: A Case for Distinction*. Millennium: Journal of International Studies.